Weber's Protestant Ethic hypothesis holds that elements of theology gave Protestants a cultural affinity with the economic demands of early market capitalism, particularly compared with their Catholic neighbors, which led to more rapid economic development in nations where Protestant culture was dominant. Previous research has found inconsistent support for a Protestant inclination toward pro-market attitudes, depending on whether the level of analysis was at the individual or national level. The present study uses cross-national panel data to combine these approaches with multilevel modeling. Results showed effects at the national level; people living in nations with dominantly Protestant cultural histories had more pro-market economic attitudes. At the individual level, there were differences in the impact of religiosity by religious group affiliation; Protestants had relatively pro-market attitudes regardless of religiosity, while members of other groups tended to increase in market orientation as a function of religiosity. Together, these effects support the existence of a Protestant Ethic that is linked with cultural Protestantism, rather than with personal adherence to specific Protestant religious beliefs.
2007). Some of these discrepancies arise because of the complexity of the relationships between the cultural and psychosocial factors involved in addressing these questions. Weber's hypothesis has implications at both the individual and cultural levels, posing analytical challenges for research in this area. Furthermore, differences in types of religiosity have not been fully conceptualized in relation to economic attitudes. The present study seeks to combine and expand on the approaches of previous analyses of the Protestant Ethic, through a multilevel analysis of cross-national data predicting a number of pro-market economic attitudes from cultural religious history, personal religious affiliation, and personal and public measures of individual religiosity.
Weber's Theory
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber (1996) attempted to account for the disparity in economic success between the nations of Northern Europe and much of the rest of the world. Since these nations did not possess any clear advantage in terms of population or natural resources, Weber turned to a cultural explanation. Specifically, he proposed that certain aspects of Protestant theology were conducive to the formation of a proto-capitalist economic ideology, so that people whose beliefs had been shaped by the Protestant worldview were better positioned to take advantage of the emerging industrial economy than were their counterparts in other nations. Early Protestant theology shifted the relationship between the person and God so that the individual, not the community, was conceived as a self-contained spiritual unit. Moreover, it emphasized prosperity and success in earthly endeavors as a sign of divine grace. At the same time, it discouraged the use of the one's wealth for hedonistic purposes.
In Weber's estimation, those who accepted the teachings of Protestant theology adopted a set of individualist values-emphasizing hard work, the pursuit of economic success, and the saving and reinvestment of profits-that coincidentally put them in an ideal position to exploit the emerging capitalist economy. Over time, these initially religious values became infused as cultural complex, shaping the beliefs of even those members of historically Protestant societies who were not personally very religious. Indeed, Weber suggested that the most successful capitalists were not the most pious Protestants, but rather those marginally religious businesspeople who had internalized the cultural values associated with the "Protestant ethic" but were not troubled by the particular teachings of the Church (Weber, 1978) . So, he argued, even as free market economies spread beyond Northern Europe, demanding that people everywhere adapt to promarket values, historically Protestant areas continued to be the wealthiest because of the culturally transmitted affinity of their populations with the economic system.
Empirical Evaluations of the Theory
Weber's account of the Protestant ethic has informed several distinct lines of empirical investigation into the relationship between religion and economics. The largest of these bodies of research has focused on the "Protestant Work Ethic" (PWE) as a personality trait related to the valuing of work over leisure time (Furnham, 1984 (Furnham, , 1990 . While this construct has been related to various differences in work values and behavior, PWE often appears to be negatively related to Protestant culture (Furnham et al., 1993) and individual Protestant affiliation (Arslan, 2001) , and thus is now generally used with little reference to its original Weberian underpinnings (Christopher, Zabel, Jones, & Marek, 2008; Miller, Woehr, & Hudspeth, 2001) .
Other studies have focused on the historical element of the Protestant ethic hypothesis, examining regional economic differences within Europe from the 16th to 18th centuries. Some of the strongest early critiques of Weber's hypothesis focused on the historical relationship between the early economic institutions of capitalism and the early Protestant churches, which were often formed later and appeared to explicitly object to the nascent capitalist system (Sameulsson, 1993; Tawney, 1926) . Recent empirical studies using historical data from this time period have supported the notion that economic growth was much more rapid in Protestant regions than in Catholic ones but have cast some doubt on the role of individuals' work-related values. One such study attributed these differences to the freedom of information exchange between cities enabled by the Protestant churches' relaxation of Catholic restrictions on publication and trade (Blum & Dudley, 2001) , while another cited the importance of individual Bible reading in the Protestant tradition as a catalyst for broader literacy that in turn enabled economic development (Becker & Woessmann, 2009) .
The availability of cross-national data on values and beliefs has driven a final strand of research in the Weberian tradition, exploring the extent to which differences in religious beliefs continue to drive differences in secular values and economic outcomes. In a study using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), Guiso et al. (2003) examined the relationships between a broad set of religious factors and values related to capitalist economics. They concluded that religious people in general also tended to be more pro-capitalist in their economic orientation but that Protestants were not different from members of any other religious groups in that respect. Norris and Inglehart (2004) , in another study using the WVS, found that Protestants were marginally more pro-capitalist than Catholics on several measures but that they were both less procapitalist than members of some other religious groups.
Focusing on the national level, rather than on individuals, one study found that the spread of Protestantism predicted economic growth in the ex-colonies of European nations (Grier, 1997) . But in a series of analyses tying religious values to national economic outcomes, Barro and McCleary (2003; McCleary & Barro, 2006) found that nations with more Protestants experienced slower economic growth overall, although the prevalence of certain religious beliefs did predict national economic performance.
These results, obtained from studies that focus on either the individual level or the cultural level alone, seem to cast doubt on the persistence of differences in Protestants' economic values and performance, if such differences ever existed. However, studies that simultaneously examine data at the individual and national level have produced results more supportive of the Protestant Ethic hypothesis. Giorgi and Marsh (1990) used cross-national data from within Europe and found that work ethic values differed both by individuals' religion and by national religious culture. Individual Protestants valued work for its own sake more than individual Catholics, but this difference was far more pronounced when comparing these groups within predominantly Protestant and Catholic countries. In countries with Protestant majorities, people tended to place more value on intrinsic elements of work (such as having an opportunity to use initiative) than on extrinsic elements (such as being highly paid), regardless of their personal religious affiliations. In a similar vein, Hayward and Kemmelmeier (2007) found that the proportion of Protestants in a country predicted the national mean level of support for competition (a central element of market capitalism) but that this relationship was suppressed by the countervailing effects of national wealth. Since Protestant nations are relatively rich, they also tend to embrace more post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1990 (Inglehart, , 1997 , which are inconsistent with the idea of competition. However, when comparing countries with similar levels of development, by controlling for GDP, Protestant countries remained more pro-competition on average than nonProtestant countries. Both Giorgi and Marsh (1990) and Hayward and Kemmelmeier (2007) provide evidence for between-country differences that may modify the relationship between religion and work-related values within individuals.
Conceptualizing Religion
Religion is a complex and multilayered phenomenon. It involves not only adopting a set of beliefs and practices but can also provide a strong source of social identity (Lickel et al., 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and motivate self-perception in line with group norms (Burris & Jackson, 2000) . Particularly germane to Weberian theory, religion is closely tied to culture (Cohen, 2009; Giorgi & Marsh, 1990; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) . An individual's religious cultural background can be at least partially gauged through personal group affiliation (e.g., Catholic or Protestant). More broadly, the values and norms of a nationally dominant religious culture may influence even those people with no formal affiliation with the group.
Beyond affiliation, different patterns of activity may reflect different elements of religion that have theoretical importance for how religious culture is enacted. It is useful to draw a distinction between private and public elements of religious expression. Private aspects of religion encompass how one subjectively views one's own religion, including the importance of belief and belonging to one's self image. Public aspects include participation in rituals and other religious activities that reinforce one's group membership and engagement in a particular religious community. To be sure, private and public religiousness are related: People for whom religion is an important part of the self are likely to choose to participate in more public religious activities, and frequent public participants may come to see themselves as more personally religious. Yet private and public religiousness may also have distinct patterns of relationships with other outcomes. For example, public and private religiousness has been found to have different relationships with mental and physical health (Baetz, Bowen, Jones, & Koru-Sengul, 2006; Ellison & Flannelly, 2009; Martin & Levy, 2006) and to interact in different ways under conditions of government regulation of religious expression (Elliott & Hayward, 2009 ). Thus, distinguishing these two types of individual religiousness is important when considering the interaction between the group-level and person-level religion.
The Present Study
This study builds on previous individual-and country-level analyses of cross-national data to construct a model of individual economic values based on both individual religious characteristics (including group affiliation, personal religiosity, and public religiosity) and the religious cultural environment. Following Guiso et al. (2003) , models are constructed for an array of outcome variables measuring individuals' endorsement of pro-capitalist economic values. Following others (Giorgi & Marsh, 1990; Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2007; Inglehart & Baker, 2000) , between-group differences in national religious culture are examined as predictors of individual values. Multilevel modeling allows us to combine these approaches, by including both individual and national levels of analysis to be as predictors of individual values in a single model. In addition, this study examines personal and public religiosity as separate constructs. By combining individual-and group-level analyses and by using a broader set of measures of religion at both levels, this approach enables us to test the Protestant Ethic hypothesis that having a Protestant cultural background and internalizing its values are the key factors linking religion with capitalist economic ideology.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Compared with members of other religious groups, Protestants have economic values that are more favorable toward capitalism, when other factors are held constant. This prediction is based on Weber's (1996) account of the relationship between religion and the origins of capitalism.
Hypothesis 2. Personal religiosity increases the favorability of economic attitudes toward capitalism more for Protestants than for members of other religious groups. This prediction is based on the finding that internalized religiousness is associated with greater identification with one's religious group and internalization of its values (Burris & Jackson, 2000) . According to the Weberian hypothesis, for Protestants those values should include economic attitudes conducive to capitalism.
Hypothesis 3. The effects of public religiosity on economic attitudes toward capitalism do not differ greatly between Protestants and members of other religious groups. This prediction is the converse of Hypothesis 2. Weber's analysis suggests that the capitalist ethos is linked to the value system implicit in the Protestant ethos. Hence, when internal identification with that ethos is held constant, outward religious practice should have little effect on these attitudes. Testing this hypothesis allows for the alternative view that religious involvement of any kind tends to increase endorsement of the dominant capitalist economic philosophy.
Hypothesis 4. Compared with other countries, nations in which Protestantism is the historically dominant religion have citizens who have more favorable attitudes toward capitalism, regardless of their individual religious affiliations. This prediction is based on the Weberian view that a religious culture comes to influence the secular cultural worldview of all inhabitants of the countries in which its members dominate the social structure (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) .
Method
This study makes use of a large cross-national, multiyear survey of individual values, which includes several items measuring economic attitudes. These data are then enriched with pertinent country-level data and analyzed using a multilevel model that separates country-level effects, individual-level effects, and effects occurring as a function of the different waves of the survey. The use of multilevel modeling techniques allows for the prediction of individual-level characteristics from samples nested within nonindependent groups (in this case, countries and survey waves), based on both individual-and cluster-level independent variables (Kashy & Kenny, 2000; Krull & MacKinnon, 2001 ).
Data
Survey data were obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS) Waves 2 through 5 (European Values Study Group & World Values Survey Association, 2009 ). The WVS is a cross-national panel survey that has been conducted in a series of five waves. In each wave, a common survey instrument is translated into local languages and administered to a random sample selected from within each of the participating countries. The sample of countries participating has changed from 20 in Wave 1 (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) , 43 in Wave 2 (1989 ( ), 54 in Wave 3 (1994 ( -1999 , 69 countries in Wave 4 (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , to 52 countries in Wave 5 (2005) (2006) . Because most of the national samples contain between 1,000 and 2,000 responses, the total number of participants for the WVS was 25,249 for Wave 1, 62,771 for Wave 2, 78,678 for Wave 3, 101,172 for Wave 4, and 76,303 for Wave 5. Wave 1 was excluded from the present study, because it did not measure any pertinent economic attitudes. National economic data were obtained from the World Bank (2009).
Measures
Economic attitudes. The outcome variables analyzed are six items that address particular aspects of attitudes regarding economic activity. All six items were measured on a 10-point scale, anchored with contrary statements at points 1 and 10. In the survey instrument, the directions of the economic attitude items were counterbalanced. For ease of interpretation, in the present analyses all items have be scaled such that a score of 10 indicates an attitude consistent with a capitalist economic philosophy, and a score of 1 indicates an attitude against it.
The first four outcome variables were included in Waves 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the WVS. Outcome Variable 1 ("income inequality") comes directly from WVS Item E035, which asked respondents to evaluate the statements "incomes should be made more equal" versus "we need larger income differences as incentives." Outcome Variable 2 ("private ownership") is reverse-coded from WVS Item E036, which asks "private ownership of business should be increased" versus "government ownership of business should be increased." Outcome Variable 3 ("individual responsibility") is reverse-coded from WVS Item E037, which asks whether "people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves" versus "the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for." Outcome Variable 4 ("in favor of competition") is reverse-coded from WVS Item E039, which asks whether "competition is good; it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas" versus "competition is harmful; it brings out the worst in people."
The final two outcome variables were asked only in Wave 3 of the WVS. Outcome Variable 5 ("hard work improves life") is reverse-coded from WVS Item E040, which asks whether "in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" versus "hard work doesn't generally bring success; it is more a matter of luck and connections." Outcome Variable 6 ("enough wealth for everyone") is taken directly from WVS Item E041, which asks whether "people can only get rich at the expense of others" versus "wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone."
Demographics. The demographic control variables included gender, age, education level, and income. Gender is coded as a binary variable with a value of 1 representing female. Age is coded in years. Education is measured on an 8-point scale, recoded from country-specific education items by the compilers of the WVS data file, with scores ranging from "inadequately completed elementary education" to "University with degree/Higher education-upper level tertiary." Income is scored on a 10-point scale representing the percentile within country of the respondent's household income. To improve the interpretability of these analyses, age, education, and income are each centered at their grand means: 41.21, 4.37, and 4.66, respectively.
Religion. Individual-level religion measures included in the present analysis include religious group affiliation, self-described religiosity, and frequency of attendance at religious services. Group affiliation information was not collected in a consistent format across countries in the WVS. For example, different Protestant denominations were counted separately in some countries, while in others they were grouped together. For the purposes of these analyses, religious affiliation was recoded into a uniform set of categories, namely Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, other religion, and no religion.
Personal religiosity is represented in these analyses by a single item from the WVS measuring subjective religiosity. The original measure asked respondents to rate the importance of God in their lives on a 10-point scale from "not at all important" to "very important." Because the effects of individual religiosity are theorized to be relative to the norms of one's social environment, this item was centered at the group mean for each survey wave within countries.
Public religiosity is represented by frequency of attendance at religious services. The original measure in the WVS takes the form of an 8-point scale from "more than once a week" to "never/ practically never." For these analyses, this item was scaled so that higher scores indicate more frequent attendance, and two response categories ("only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter" and "only on other specific holy days") were combined. The result is a 7-point scale from no attendance to frequent attendance. This item was also centered at the group mean for each survey wave within countries.
Country-level religiosity was entered into the model as a Level 2 effect; the individual-level personal and public religiosity measures described above were aggregated within survey wave groups. Hence, individuals from the same country who were surveyed in the same wave all had the same value on these measures of cultural religiosity.
National wealth. To control for the potential relationship of national wealth with economic values, per capita gross domestic product per capita (GDP) was included in the model at Level 2. Per capita GDP measures corresponding with each country by survey year pair, expressed in constant 2000 U.S. dollars, were obtained from the World Bank (2009) . To avoid producing very small model coefficients, per capita GDP was transformed by dividing by 1,000.
Historical religious zones. In the present analyses, historical religious culture is measured at the country level using a classification scheme first suggested by Huntington's (1993) well-known "clash of civilizations" hypothesis and refined by Inglehart and Baker (2000) in their cultural analysis of WVS data. This system divides countries into groups based on shared religious history. It does not necessarily correspond with current rates of religious adherence. For example, there are fewer Protestants than Catholics in Switzerland (U. S. Department of State Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2009), but because of the historical impact of Protestant churches on that country's civic and political institutions, it is classified in the Protestant historical religious zone.
Results
For each of the six outcome measures of economic attitudes, a mixed-level linear model analysis was conducted, including both individual-and country-level predictors of the attitude measure. For each model, significant intraclass correlations at Levels 2 (survey) and 3 (country) indicated that the data were nonindependent within clusters and thus that multilevel modeling was an appropriate analytical approach (see Table 1 ). Furthermore, reductions in the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC; see Table 1 ) between the null and full models indicated that a significant proportion of the variance was explained in the full model. Level 1 (individual) predictors in each model included demographics (gender, age, education level, and income), religious affiliation (Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, other, or none), personal religiosity, and public religiosity. Level 1 interaction effects for religious affiliation by personal religiosity, and religious affiliation by public religiosity, were also included. At the country level, historical religious zone (Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, or Orthodox Christian) was included in the model. A summary of estimated coefficients for all main effects is provided in Table 1 . Simple effects derived from the interaction coefficients are summarized in Table 2 .
Demographic effects. The estimated coefficients for the demographic factors were fairly consistent across the six economic attitudes. Men tended to hold capitalist values significantly more strongly than women, except on the "enough wealth for everyone" variable, for which there was a small effect in the opposite direction. Older age was associated with less strongly capitalist values for three variables (income inequality, private ownership, and individual responsibility) but with more strongly capitalist values for the other three (competition, hard work improves life, and enough wealth for everyone). Higher education level and higher annual income were both associated with more pro-capitalist values for all of the outcome variables.
Religious group affiliation main effects. While there were differences between outcome variables in the pattern of differences based on individuals' religious traditions, in all cases where there were significant main effects for religious group (see Table 1 ), Protestants tended to hold more pro-capitalist economic values than others. In comparison with Catholics, the key point of reference for testing Weber's theory, Protestants were significantly more likely than Catholics to think that hard work improves life, to favor expanding private ownership, and to think that individuals should provide for themselves. There were also nonsignificant trends for more pro-capitalist sentiment among Protestants on the remaining three outcome variables. All models include 16 interaction terms, between each Level 1 religion category and personal and public religiosity. Table 2 reports simple slopes based on these terms. a. Protestant is the reference category b. Protestant History is the reference category *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 1. (continued)
Personal religiosity. The simple effects of personal religiosity for members of each religious group can be found in the top half of Table 2 . For each of the pro-capitalist outcome variables, personal religiosity had a significant impact for members of at least some religious groups (see the first set of significance levels displayed in Table 2 ). In general, more subjectively religious individuals tended to also have more pro-capitalist economic values, although the reverse was true for support of private as opposed to government ownership of businesses. There were some differences between Protestants and members of other groups in the magnitude of these effects (see the second set of significance levels in Table 2 ); however, the personal religiosity simple effects for Catholics did not differ significantly from Protestants on any of the economic values examined. That is, being personally more religious was not more strongly associated with procapitalist values among Protestants than among Catholics. For all coefficients, the first significance level indicates difference of the simple slope from 0, and the second indicates difference of the simple slope from the simple slope for Protestants.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Public religiosity. The simple effects of public religiosity for members of each religious group can also be found in the bottom half of Table 2 . Compared with the effects of personal religiosity, the pattern of effects for public religiosity was less consistent across outcome variables, including a variety of both positive and negative relationships. The effects of public religiosity tended to be relatively weak for Protestants, compared with members of other groups, including Catholics.
National wealth. Per capita GDP was significantly related to three of the outcome variables. People in wealthier countries were, on average, more supportive of the "private ownership" and "personal responsibility" items but were less positive about the value of competition.
Country-level religiosity. The mean level of personal religiosity within each country had a significant relationship with three of the outcome variables. People from more personally religious countries tended to favor private ownership less but were more likely to think that hard work improves life and that there is enough wealth for everyone. Mean within-country public religiosity was significantly related only to the "enough wealth for everyone" outcome variable. People in more publicly religious countries tended to agree less with the idea that there is enough wealth to go around for everyone willing to work for it.
Religious history. The association between religious history, at the country level, and individual endorsement of capitalist economic values varied in intensity but was highly consistent in direction. There were significant differences between countries with Protestant histories and other cultural zones for five of the outcome variables: all of them except for approval of income inequality. Protestant nations were more pro-capitalist than the key comparison group of Catholic nations on all measures where the two differed significantly, and the nonsignificant coefficients were also in the theorized direction. Only on the outcome variable relating to the belief that there is enough wealth for everyone were Protestant nations significantly less pro-capitalist than any other group; on this measure, countries with Buddhist and Confucian histories tended to be more pro-capitalist.
Discussion
This study found some support for Weber's (1996) Protestant ethic hypothesis that Protestantism contrasts with other religious traditions in that it is associated with economic values conducive to free-market capitalism. These results were generally consistent across a range of outcome measures of economic values. Crucially, however, these associations were stronger with respect to indicators of cultural Protestantism than with respect to individual Protestant religiosity. At the group level, pro-capitalist sentiment was highest in countries with histories of Protestant dominance, after controlling for other national factors. At the individual level, for people with average levels of religiosity, Protestants tended to be more pro-capitalist than adherents of other religions. However, while greater religiosity-both personal and public-tended to be associated with stronger pro-capitalist sentiments for members of most groups, Protestants were affected relatively weakly in this way. That is, while highly religious members of all groups tended to be more pro-capitalist, Protestants tended to be more pro-capitalist regardless of how religious they were personally. While Catholics were the key group against whom Weber compared Protestants' economic values, this study found that Protestants were more pro-capitalist than adherents of other major religious traditions as well. For example, Protestants' economic values contrasted even more with those of Orthodox Christians and Muslims than with the values of Catholics.
The present study found group differences between Protestants and members of other religious groups on all of the economic values examined in this study, but the pattern of relationships was not identical across values. The largest national-level difference observed in this study was between historically Protestant and Catholic countries in the belief that success in life is the result of hard work. This finding is noteworthy because the evaluation of hard work is at the heart of the Protestant Ethic hypothesis. Beyond any country differences, individual Protestants also tended to endorse this belief more than their Catholic counterparts. Similarly, individual Protestantism was strongly linked to the beliefs that competition enhances achievement, that private enterprise should be expanded, and that individuals should provide for themselves rather than relying on the government.
Protestantism was less strongly linked to the views that income inequality is a valuable incentive and that wealth can grow to provide for everyone. The latter two beliefs might be seen as more abstract views about how economies in general work, rather than referring to the personal qualities that make specific individuals virtuous, as the other four might do. This pattern makes sense within the Protestant Ethic framework. Protestants seem to be distinct in their particular views about the virtue of individual work and self-reliance (ideas related to the notion of individual salvation), rather than simply being in favor of an abstract market ideology (which is less closely related to historical theological constructs).
Thus, the analyses generally supported Hypothesis 1 (individual Protestant affiliation is positively associated with pro-capitalist values), Hypothesis 3 (the effect of public religiosity on economic values is not greater for Protestants than for members of other religious groups), and Hypothesis 4 (national Protestant history is positively associated with pro-capitalist values). Hypothesis 2 was not supported; personal religiousness was a stronger predictor of pro-capitalist values for members of non-Protestant religious groups. Taken together, these findings point to the conclusion that there is something unique and persistent about Protestantism as a cultural system that may foster a particular set of economic values associated with capitalism and the individual accumulation of wealth but that is nevertheless not dependent on active religiosity. In fact, the greatest contrast in the extent of individual pro-capitalist values between Protestant and non-Protestant religious groups is among those who are only nominally religious. Similarly, there are large differences in pro-capitalist sentiment between individuals living in historically Protestant and non-Protestant nations, regardless of those individuals' actual personal religious affiliations.
These findings are all the more remarkable because the worldwide adoption of market economics-and general diffusion of values due to long-term cross-cultural contact-in the centuries since the historical divergence of economic values that Weber wrote about might be expected to dilute any residual effects of religious culture. Moreover, the post-materialist value shifts associated with the advance of economic development-which has been particularly pronounced in historically Protestant nations-would tend to mitigate in the direction of softening many pro-capitalist economic values (Hayward & Kemmelmeier, 2007; Inglehart, 1977 Inglehart, , 1997 .
Many questions remain with respect to how the relationship between religious culture and economic values is mediated at the individual and group levels, and the extent to which other, non-religious, cultural factors explain the observed differences between Protestants and others. For example, while some of the largest religious differences in economic values observed were between Protestants and Orthodox Christians, it is very plausible that the recent history of communist economies in the majority of historically Orthodox nations has more to do with these differences in values than any cultural differences driven by theology. The finding that religiosity has an impact on values for individuals who do not identify with any religious group also appears somewhat counterintuitive and may have unexamined cultural causes. There is a great deal of heterogeneity in the distributions of both personal and public religiosity within this "no religion" group. This may indicate that it contains a range of subgroups including convinced atheists, practitioners of non-organizational spirituality, and individuals who participate regularly in traditional religious practices for the sake of family or community commitments without feeling a sense of belief or belonging. As the meaning of identifying as non-religious is likely to be highly sensitive to cultural norms, more work is needed to understand the effects observed in this group.
The lack of self-identified Confucians in the WVS sample made it impossible to address the possibility that, analogous to Weber's Protestant Ethic, there is a Confucian Work Ethic (Lim, 2003) that promotes pro-market economic values among Confucians. Some findings from this study appear to be consistent with the existence of an Islamic Work Ethic that promotes hard work for communal rather than individual gain (Ali & Al-Owaihan, 2008) . Muslims were similar to Protestants in their endorsement of the value of work, but they were also considerably less supportive of competition and the value of individual rather than government responsibility. Additional theoretical and empirical work is needed to identify and test elements of culture such as these that might explain some of the relationships found in this study. Furthermore, while the nation is a convenient unit of analysis for cross-cultural research, there are regional and communitylevel differences in religious history and variation that were not addressed in this study. More granular data could strengthen these results and generate a better understanding of how cultural effects of this type are disseminated.
Overall, these results provide some significant support for Weber's Protestant Ethic hypothesis, based on a multilevel analysis of broad cross-national data. In contrast with previous studies that used the WVS to address this hypothesis with respect to individual outcomes (e.g., Guiso et al., 2003; Norris & Inglehart, 2004) , this study was able to take into account the shared within-country variability in values that might be attributed to historical differences in national religious culture (see also Giorgi & Marsh, 1990) . These findings support the notion that Protestantism-particularly when compared with Catholicism-continues to be linked with a certain set of market-oriented economic values, even if it is not necessarily being more pious that makes Protestants more procapitalist. More broadly, they point to the notion that individual values are shaped by cultural context. This appreciation of religion's simultaneous roles, both within individuals and also as part of a broader cultural complex, is central to the enduring appeal of Weber's Protestant Ethic.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
